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Abstract
We present and defend the Australian Plan semantics for negation. This is a compre-
hensive account, suitable for a variety of different logics. It is based on two ideas. The
first is that negation is an exclusion-expressing device: we utter negations to express
incompatibilities. The second is that, because incompatibility is modal, negation is
a modal operator as well. It can, then, be modelled as a quantifier over points in
frames, restricted by accessibility relations representing compatibilities and incom-
patibilities between such points. We defuse a number of objections to this Plan, raised
by supporters of the American Plan for negation, in which negation is handled via a
many-valued semantics. We show that the Australian Plan has substantial advantages
over the American Plan.
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It has occurred to several authors ...
that we might refute A ∧ ¬A → B
by making A ∧ ¬A true but B false.
The trick is to make each of A, ¬A
true. There is an American plan for
doing this, on which A may be
viewed as both true and false ... But
we have come to praise the
contrasting Australian Plan.
R.K. Meyer & E.P. Martin, Logic on
the Australian Plan
1 Introduction
The last third of the Twentieth century saw a flowering of work in non-classical
logics: the study of relevant logics, paraconsistent logics, orthologic, constructive
logics, fuzzy logics, substructural logics and their cousins gave rise to a plethora of
different kinds of models for such logics. One point of distinction in these models
is the treatment of negation.1 After the initial flurry of proposals for different ways
to understand the logical connectives and, particularly, negation, the time came to
survey the field. Robert K. Meyer and Errol P. Martin made a proposal for how to
understand this landscape in their important, but relatively neglected paper, Logic on
the Australian Plan [28].2
Given model-theoretic treatments that evaluate formulas at points (worlds, con-
structions, states, situations, setups, or whatever), Meyer and Martin distinguished
those which take the relationship between formulas and points to be two-valued (for
each point x and formula A, either x  A or x  A), and those for which the
relationship is fundamentally more complicated. In Meyer and Martin’s sights were
those models in which there are four possible semantic values: a formula can be true,
false, both or neither. Two-valued semantics follow the Australian Plan. Four-valued
semantics follow the American Plan.
Meyer and Martin’s paper was directed towards understanding the costs and ben-
efits of different semantic schemes for relevant logics. But the point is more general
than this. For example, a traditional Kripke or Beth semantics for intuitionist logic
[23] is also a kind of Australian Plan semantics, while Wansing’s semantics for con-
structible negation [48] is a kind of American Plan semantics. The distinction applies
very generally, to a sweep of different logics.
Here’s why this is a salient distinction: in a range of non-classical logics, negation
is not Boolean. In point semantics for relevant and paraconsistent logics, the argu-
ment from A,¬A to B is made to fail by allowing A and ¬A to both hold at some
1For a general, but thorough introduction, see [47].
2A Google Scholar search finds only 39 citations for this paper as of late September, 2018. Thirteen of
these citations are by the authors of this paper.
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point. In paracomplete logics (allowing for ‘gaps’), the argument from A to B ∨ ¬B
is given a counterexample by allowing for B and ¬B to both fail at some point. How,
then, does the status of a negation ¬C at a point depend on the status of C?
Following the Australian Plan requires the semantic value of a negation, ¬C, at
a point x to depend on more than just the value of C at that point. If the semantics
is to be compositional, it seems that negation must act like a modal: whether ¬C
holds here depends on whether C holds elsewhere, in the same way that whether C
holds in this possible world depends on whether C holds in other (relatively possible)
worlds. Simplicity for semantic values (the Boolean yes/no answer, at each point)
comes at the cost of complexity for the evaluation clause for negation.
In the American Plan, negation can have a relatively simple interpretation: ¬A is
true (that is, true only or both true and false) if and only if A is false (that is, false
only or both true and false), and ¬A is false if and only if A is true. Simplicity in
the clauses for negation is bought at the cost of making semantic values more com-
plex. Having four values is only a little more than the two Boolean truth values. But
the shift to four values ramifies throughout the entire semantics: each time one intro-
duces a new concept or operator (necessity, a relevant or counterfactual conditional, a
non-standard quantifier), this must now be given independent truth as well as falsity
conditions. Things get cumbersome for the four-valued approach, for instance, when
a relevant conditional is introduced: see e.g. [31], [27, p. 89]. Under the Australian
plan, no such complexity arises. Once the truth conditions for a concept are given on
the set of points, this automatically determines the interaction between that concept
and negation. All of this has been well understood since Meyer and Martin’s original
mapping of the terrain. However, much has changed in the decades since. The time
has come to revisit some issues.
Starting in the 1990s, the Australian Plan has been generalized into a comprehen-
sive approach to negation. Attention has shifted from Meyer and Martin’s treatment
of a de Morgan negation, modelled by the distinctive semantic device of the Rout-
ley star [42]. Negation is understood as a modal operator, whose semantics is given
in terms of relations of compatibility and incompatibility between points [15]. It has
been connected to broader themes in philosophical logic, such as logical pluralism [4,
5, 8] and the interpretation and applications of substructural logics [33, 34]. Further-
more, claims to the fundamental role of compatibility and incompatibility relations
in giving an account of negation, also independently of direct appeal to the model
theory of the Australian Plan, have been made in Aristotelian metaphysics [6, 7, 44]
and in normative pragmatic accounts of semantics [10, 11, 22, 29, 36].
However, the Australian Plan has recently come under attack by proponents of a
version of the American Plan, De and Omori [12]. In this paper we will update the
Australian plan in the light of recent developments in logic. We will examine De
and Omori’s criticisms,3 show that the Australian Plan—not only the Routley star
3Henceforth we use ‘D&O’ for De and Omori, ‘FB’ and ‘GR’ for the authors of this paper when we need
to be referred to independently.
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semantics for negation, but the entire approach of treating negation as a point shift
operator—survives unscathed, that its advantages over the American Plan remain
intact, and substantial.4
2 Grounding Negation
Critics of the Australian Plan tend to run together different matters. So it falls on us
to distinguish them. There are two key ideas in the (generalized) Australian Plan’s
(in)compatibility semantics. Idea 1: We utter claims of the form ‘¬A’ in order to rule
out something. That is: to express a certain exclusion, or incompatibility.
This may be further specified in different ways. Incompatibility may be under-
stood (a) in a normatively pragmatic fashion, as signaling that the utterer takes
a certain stance and commits to it. This reading is favored by authors who have
entertained a characterization of negation in terms of incompatible pragmatic and
inferential commitments, such as Robert Brandom [10, 11], or Huw Price, to whose
work [29] we will come back soon. Such a normative pragmatic account can also be
understood in terms of the primitive incompatibility of the speech acts of assertion
and denial, combined with an account of negation as a means to make explicit what
is implicit in the incompatibility of assertion and denial [36–38].
Incompatibility may also be specified (b) in more realist, metaphysically commit-
ting ways, as expressing that some thing is the case (obtains, is instantiated, realized,
or whatnot), which rules out something else in the world. Here ‘ruling out’ is, thus,
understood as a metaphysical relation between worldly items: properties, states of
affairs, circumstances, or whatever else. This is the reading favoured by FB, but also
by other authors, such as [21]. Being an Australian, GR is also comfortable with
such robust metaphysical vocabulary; but in this paper we will be largely agnostic
between (a) the normatively pragmatic and (b) the metaphysical specifications of
incompatibility.
Either way, negation is understood as an exclusion-expressing device: its existence
in the language (indeed, in any natural language we know of) is explained by ground-
ing it in notions involving compatibility and incompatibility or exclusion. A first,
legitimate question semanticists following this path are liable to be asked, therefore,
is: What does ‘grounding’ mean here?
Some remarks by D&O indicate that they take the salient sense of grounding to be
reduction via definition. They are troubled, then, by the fact that negative particles
or prefixes show up in the names of various concepts proposed to do the grounding
work, as this would make the attempted definition circular:
4A Referee of this journal kindly reminded us to clarify the narrower and wider reading of ‘Australian
plan’. We focus in this paper on the more general approach to negation; not only because we take modal
approaches to negation to be important and interesting, but also because D&O’s arguments apply not just
to the Routley star semantics in particular, but also to compatibility semantics in general. As we show
below and one of us, GR, has shown in such works as [33], the Routley star semantics is a special case of
the general framework.
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In explaining incompatibility, using expressions like ‘exclude’, ‘preclude’, and
‘rule out’ [...] does not suggest that incompatibility is primitive. It is after all possi-
ble, for instance, that the prefixes ‘ex-’ and ‘pre-’ here signal the use of negation, as
does the ‘out’ in ‘ruling out’, or that the expressions in any case have meanings or
truth conditions that depend on negation whether or not those expressions contain
subexpressions signaling the use of negation. [...] It is important to notice that if
incompatibility is defined from compatibility and negation, (S¬) [scil. the targeted
semantic clause for negation] becomes circular since the definiendum occurs in
the definiens. The version of (S¬) given in terms of incompatibility (got by contra-
posing and removing double negations)5 would remain circular on the assumption
that incompatibility is understood in terms of negation and compatibility. [12, p. 5
and fn, notation adjusted for consistency with ours.]
Now we agree, of course, that it would be bad if one were to define negation by
using notions which are themselves defined using negation.
However, the Australian Plan is no attempt to define negation away by reducing
it to some other notion which makes no mention of negation. One of us, FB, has
expressed, in print and in the very paper [8] targeted by D&O, skepticism (on which
GR agrees) on any attempted definitional reduction of fundamental notions like ref-
erence, identity, necessity, or negation. Any elucidation of such notions is likely to
make essential use of those very notions somewhere, in such a way that the expla-
nation as a whole cannot count as a reductive definition. A few examples of the
pervasiveness of the phenomenon (of course, we don’t claim that these settle the
respective issues):
• In Naming and Necessity, Kripke claimed (or, went very close to claiming)
that the notion of reference is primitive: ‘Philosophical analyses of some con-
cepts like reference, in completely different terms which make no mention of
reference, are very apt to fail.’ [24, p. 94].
• Wiggins [49] famously argued that the concept of identity is primitive and co-
originary with predication: a is F iff a is some F , that is, Fa iff ∃x(x =
a & Fx).6
• Kit Fine stated of the notion of reality that, while ‘we seem to have a good intu-
itive grasp of the concept’, he does ‘not see any way to define the concept of
reality in essentially different terms’ [18, p. 175].
• Many take the concept of set as a candidate primitive. We give examples, and we
elucidate it by saying that a set is a collection or an aggregate of objects, but that
is no definition of the notion set in set-free vocabulary.
5We will come back below to the version of (S¬) using compatibility, and its contraposed, using
incompatibility, after we have presented a formal semantics to serve as the target for some of D&O’s
objections.
6‘No reduction of the identity relation has ever succeeded. [...] Nor yet is it called for, once we realize how
much can be achieved in philosophy by means of elucidations that put concepts to use without attempting
to reduce it but, in using the concept, exhibit its connections with other concepts that are established,
genuinely coeval or collateral, and independently intelligible.’ [49, p. 5].
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• Examine the clauses for conjunction, disjunction, or the quantifiers in your
favorite model-theoretic or proof-theoretic semantics. You will find that these
use the very notions that are being explicated. Nonetheless, the clauses are
informative.
Australian Plan semanticists have a similar attitude towards the notion of negation
and its relationship to incompatibility. Negation is as basic to our grasp of language
as these other concepts are to our grasp of mathematics, logic, language, and the
world at large. We should not expect explications of such notions to be reductions.
How, then, is negation grounded in compatibility and incompatibility, since
‘grounded’ is not to mean ‘reduced by definition to’? The question making for the
title of [29], which inspired FB, was: ‘Why “Not”?’. That is: Why do we possess
the concept of negation? (Thus, the question wasn’t, ‘What “Not”?’, understood as a
request for a reductive definition.) Price’s opening words:
This paper addresses some questions about negation. What is negation good for?
What is its linguistic function? How might it plausibly have developed in natural
language, and what if anything does this tell us about its properties? The project
is thus to explain the existence and nature of negation in ordinary language. [29,
p. 221]
And the answer given by Price was a psychological-genetic account of how
creatures capable of perceiving the world around themselves, and willing to pass
on to their peers information about such shared world, may benefit by having an
exclusion-expressing device in their communicative toolkit. D&O claim to be ‘not
much concerned with the psychological account’ [12, p. 5]. But this is essential to
the whole story, so we are concerned with it.
Price asks us to imagine a community, the Ideological Positivists, whose language
is devoid of negation. Here’s how a conversation between me and you as members of
such community may go:
Me: ‘Fred is in the kitchen.’ (Sets off for kitchen.)
You: ‘Wait! Fred is in the garden.’
Me: ‘I see. But he is in the kitchen, so I’ll go there.’ (Sets off.)
You: ‘You lack understanding. The kitchen is Fred-free.’
Me: ‘Is it really? But Fred’s in it, and that’s the important thing. (Leaves for
kitchen.).
Your problem is to get me to appreciate that your claims are incompatible with
mine. [29, p. 224]
What would make things easier is a ‘Lo, Fred is not in the kitchen’. That is: ‘Fred
is somewhere else – in the garden – and his being there rules out his being in the
kitchen’.
Price then asks, ‘Where might a sense of incompatibility first arise?’ [29, p. 226].
Answer: it comes from our experience of the world as agents that face choices
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between performing some action or other – something we think animals as well deal
with every day. To face a choice is to experience an incompatibility: one cannot have
it both ways.
One could further specify Idea 1 in normatively pragmatic terms as per option (a),
flagged above. The clash of incompatibility is first expressed when we rule options
in or out, whether to ourselves or in dialog. When I consider options in planning by
myself, or in arguing with someone else, I rule an option in by making an assertion,
and I rule it out by denying it. To say ‘yes’ to the claim that Fred is in the kitchen
is to say ‘no’ to the claim that he is in the garden. We take pro and con attitudes to
options before we have an embeddable, composable negation. The incompatibility
between acts of assertion and denial – that we take them to clash – is prior to any
incompatibility expressed in assertions of negations. Assertions of negations then
make explicit what is implicit in the clash between assertion and denial. Such is
the direction of explanation between incompatibility and negation favoured in GR’s
works.
One could go for a more metaphysically committing route, as per option (b) above,
favoured by FB. One may track our experience of incompatibility to our basic capac-
ity of locating objects in space-time (this – located entirely here, with such and such
boundaries – cannot be that – which is just down there); or of appreciating percep-
tual incompatibilities concerning colours and dimensions (this is blue all over, which
rules out its being red all over; this is about one inch long, which rules its being six
inches long).7
Either way, here’s how incompatibility grounds negation: it explains why we have
the concept of negation. It allows one to answer questions like: Why is negation
ubiquitous? Why do we have negations in any natural language we know of? We have
them, the answer goes, because things ruling out things make for a universal feature
of experience, whether this boils down to the need to take exclusionary commitments,
or it involves more metaphysical incompatibilities between worldly features. We need
a linguistic device to express and report instances of such ubiquity.
It’s no use, then, to complain that expressions like ‘ex-’ and ‘in-’ show up in the
names of the relevant concepts. If the story is right, we have negation in our lan-
guage in order to express exclusions. So it’s no surprise that negation shows up in
such expressions as ‘incompatibility’ and ‘ruling out’, which we use to talk about
exclusions. On the contrary, that’s precisely what one should expect.
So when D&O ‘agree with Price [and, both of us] that there is a sense of incom-
patibility that is more primitive than sentential negation; surely very young children
and animals can see when two states are incompatible in some sense before they
grasp anything like sentential negation’ [12, p. 5], they have already granted a good
deal of what an Australian Plan semanticist asks for. And when they add that ‘where
we disagree with is that it is this very notion of incompatibility that grounds the truth
7Such examples come from the literature on the metaphysics of exclusion: [45] mentions phenomenologi-
cal colour incompatibilities, concepts that express our categorization of physical objects in space and time,
such as x being here right now and x being way over there right now, for a suitably small x. Other cases
are provided by Grim [21] and Tahko [44].
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conditions of negated sentences’ (Ibid), that may be because they take the Australian
Plan to aim at something it never aimed at to begin with.
Regardless, D&O express various other reasons for dissatisfaction with the Aus-
tralian Plan. To deal with them, we need to make the Plan more precise. We begin in
the next section.
3 Algebras, Frames, Points, Worlds
One who claims that negation is grounded, in the aforementioned sense, in compati-
bility and incompatibility, is liable to be asked to make one’s views more precise by
providing a formal treatment of these relations and their relata. Now ‘Incompatibility’
and ‘compatibility’ sound modal: to claim that x is compatible with y is to claim that
x and y can coexist. (How to fine-tune ‘coexist’ depends, of course, on what x and y
are – a point to which we shall return.) The key Idea 2 of the Australian Plan is that,
therefore, one can expect an account of negation grounding it in such notions to be a
modal one.
This is no very specific commitment yet. In particular, it does not mandate resort-
ing to (what we nowadays call) Kripke-style frame semantics, using points in frames
and accessibility relations between them. The origins of incompatibility semantics
can be traced back to the Birkoff–von Neumann–Goldblatt characterization of ortho-
negation in quantum logic [9, 20]. This was based on frames comprising points and
relations between them, but the points were narrowly taken as possible outcomes of
experimental measurements, of the kind performed by quantum physicists. One such
relation was labelled as ‘orthogonality’, also called ‘perp’ (say, ‘uprise’), expressing the
idea that two outcomes are incompatible with one another: if a and b are possible
outcomes, ‘a uprise b’ means that outcome a rules out outcome b.
One could generalize the insight beyond quantum experiments in an algebraic (as
opposed to Kripke-frame) setting. To get a feel of how this may go, take a quadruple
〈S,≤,uprise,∨〉, where S is a nonempty set of points (read: states); ≤ and uprise are binary
relations on S: s ≤ t (read: ‘s entails t’) is a pre-order (reflexive and transitive);
s uprise t (read: ‘s rules out t’) is our incompatibility relation between states;
∨
is a join
operation defined for all subsets of S (so 〈S,∨〉 is a complete join semilattice): given
a set of states T ⊆ S, ∨ T is the (possibly infinitary) join of all items in T .
A state may have one or more incompatible peers, thus, e.g., Grim [21] talks about
‘exclusionary classes’: for a given s, let Es = {t | s uprise t} be the set of states s is
incompatible with. We could then characterize negation (not-s: ‘It is not the case that
s’) in our algebra just as
∨
Es . If the exclusionary class for s is finite, not-s is like
a plain join of states s1 ∨ · · · ∨ sn ∈ Es . If on the other hand we have an infinity of
incompatibles, not-s may be recaptured by quantifiying over states in S:
• not-s = ∃t (t & t uprise s)
‘There’s some state t , such that: t , and t rules s out’. Either way, we make sense
of not-s as the weakest incompatible via the following equivalence:
• x ≤ not-s iff x uprise s
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The left-to-right direction says that whatever entails not-s is incompatible with s.
The right-to-left direction says that not-s is the weakest incompatible, i.e., that which
is entailed by any incompatible x. Plugging in not-s for x and detaching, we get:
• not-s uprise s
that is, not-s rules s out. Talk of ‘weakest incompatible’ connects to how asserting
that one exclusionary state is the case (‘Our new sofa is red’, ruling out that it’s blue)
generally sounds more informative than asserting the entailed negation (‘Our new
sofa is not blue’, i.e., it has some color or other incompatible with blue: yellow, white,
orange. . . ).
We shall add no more to this sketchy presentation of the algebraic approach
because, as a matter of historical fact, negation on the Australian Plan has not been
phrased algebraically, but rather in terms of frame semantics generalising the stan-
dard Kripke semantics for modal logics. Semantics of this kind typically consist of
structures including points at which formulas are evaluated, and a relation between
these points, understood as compatibility. Negation is a quantifier over such points,
restricted via that relation from the perspective of a given point. Thus, negation is
a modal in the following, plain sense: the status of a negated sentence at a point
may depend on the status of the sentence at other points. It is a framework of this
kind (see, for example, [26, 27, 33, 34, 39, 40]) that is targeted by D&O when they
claim that ‘the modal account of negation is implausible for providing an explanation
as to when a negated sentence is true.’ [12, p. 3].
The points of evaluation in such frame semantics, as a matter of fact, have often-
times been labeled as ‘worlds’. This may be misleading, but it is so, we submit, in no
more dangerous a way than when points in the frame semantics of various nonclassi-
cal logics are so labeled. One of us (GR) has talked of ‘cases’ in various works, e.g.,
[5]. When we speak of worlds, or cases, in the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic
logic, or in the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logics, or in the frame semantics
for various substructural logics (linear logics, Lambek calculus, or else), the crucial
question is how those points ought to be interpreted, that is, what the mathematical
formalisms are to represent. We will get back to this. Let us first see how a simple
Kripke-style frame semantics in the tradition of the Australian Plan could go.
We have a sentential language L with a set LAT of atoms p, q, r (p1, p2, . . .), the
binary connectives ∧ and ∨, the unary connectives  and ¬, the 0-ary connectives
 and ⊥, round brackets as auxiliary symbols. We use A,B,C, (A1, A2, . . .) as
metavariables for formulas. The well-formed formulas are the items in LAT ,  and
⊥ and, if A and B are formulas, (A ∧ B), (A ∨ B),A,¬A (outermost brackets are
normally omitted).
A frame for L is a quadruple F = 〈W,P,C,〉, where W is a nonempty set,
P,C ⊆ W × W ,  is a partial ordering on W . We use a, b, c, x, y, z (x1, x2, . . .)
in the metalanguage as variables ranging on items in W , as well as the set-theoretic
notation and the symbols ∀, ∃,⇒,⇔, &, or , with the usual reading.
The official reading of the frame is: W is a set of worlds (we will not speak of
possible worlds, for reasons that will become clear soon). P and C are two acces-
sibility relations on worlds. When 〈x, y〉 ∈ P we write this as xPy and claim that
y is possible relative to x. When 〈x, y〉 ∈ C we write this as xCy and claim that
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x is compatible with y.  is to be thought of as an information ordering, as in the
Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic [23]. Here, worlds are understood as repre-
senting the epistemic states of the idealized mathematician (the ‘creative subject’ of
Brouwer’s). More generally, the official reading of ‘x  y’ is that world y retains at
least all the information in world x.
Now unless  boils down to identity, the points in our frames cannot be taken as
the ordinary, maximally consistent possible worlds of standard modal semantics. It
doesn’t make sense to claim that one such world can properly include the information
carried by another such world. These worlds are maximally informative: the one way
for y to retain at least all the information in x is for y to be x.
On the other hand, Barwise and Perry’s situation semantics [1, 2, 32] already
showed the usefulness of situations, taken as partial states of reality; and for such
partial items, non-trivial informational inclusion is not only natural: it is an essential
aspect of what it is for situations to be partial states. To use a familiar example: the
situation consisting of GR’s living room in Melbourne does not carry information
about the weather in Sydney, whereas the situation in Australia as a whole does carry
that information; and the latter situation properly includes the former.
In standard possible worlds semantics, the proposition expressed by formula A is
taken as |A| ∈ P(W), the set of worlds where A is true. But when points in frames
can stand in non-trivial information-inclusion relations, one should take the set of
propositions in a frame F — call that set Prop(F), a subset of the power set of worlds
P(W) — as including only sets closed upwards with respect to : X ∈ Prop(F)
only if x ∈ X & x  y ⇒ y ∈ X [33, 35].
A frame becomes a modelM = 〈W,P,C,,〉 when one adds an interpretation,
, relating worlds to formulas: we write ‘x  A’ to mean that A holds at x, ‘x  A’
to mean that A fails at x. We will only deal with admissible interpretations where,
for each p ∈ LAT , |p| = {x ∈ W | x  p} ∈ Prop(F), satisfying the so-called
Heredity Constraint on atoms [14, 30]. For each x, y ∈ W :
• (HC) x  p & x  y ⇒ y  p
The HC makes obvious sense: if all the information in x is retained in y, and p
holds at x, then p must also hold at y. HC generalizes to all formulas of L once the
semantic clauses for the connectives are given. These go as follows. For all x ∈ W :
• (S∧) x  A ∧ B ⇔ x  A & x  B
• (S∨) x  A ∨ B ⇔ x  A or x  B
• (S) x  
• (S⊥) x  ⊥
• (S) x  A ⇔ ∀y(xPy ⇒ y  A)
• (S¬) x  ¬A ⇔ ∀y(xCy ⇒ y  A)
D&O claim that they ‘have no use’ [12, p. 3, fn] for our penultimate item, the
positive modal of necessity with its usual accessibility relation, P . We do. Highlight-
ing a number of obvious connections and dualities between it and our last item, the
negative modal with its compatibility relation, C, will help understanding.
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Here’s a first connection. The following conditions on all x, y, x1, y1 ∈ W make
 interact properly with relative possibility and compatibility:
• (Forwards) xPy & x1  x & y  y1 ⇒ x1Py1
• (Backwards) xCy & x1  x & y1  y ⇒ x1Cy1
Forwards is just a familiar condition on positive modalities from normal modal
logics. Backwards is found in a number of works on negation as a modal [13; 15, see,
for example,16]. Technically, they allow the Heredity Constraint to generalize by
straightforward induction to all formulas of L: for each A and for all x, y ∈ W :
x  A & x  y ⇒ y  A. Also, |A| = {x ∈ W | x  A} ∈ Prop(F). Intuitively,
both make a lot of sense:
• Forwards: if xPy, that is, y is possible relative to x, then everything necessary
at x holds at y: this is just what the clause for necessity (S) says. Then if
x1  x, whatever is necessary at x must already be such at x1, because the former
preserves the information supported by the latter. And if y  y1, then anything
holding at y must hold at y1 for the same reason. Then whatever is necessary at
x1 holds at y1, therefore y1 is possible relative to x1, x1Py1.
• Backwards: if xCy, that is, x is compatible with y, then nothing ruled out at x
holds at y: this is just what the clause for negation (S¬) says. Then if x1  x,
anything ruled out at x must already be such at x1, because the former preserves
the information supported by the latter. And if y1  y, then anything ruled out at
y must be ruled out at y1 for the same reason. Then nothing ruled out at x1 holds
at y1, therefore x1 is compatible with y1, x1Cy1.
Finally, we define logical consequence in a frame F as truth preservation at all
points x in F in all admissible interpretations (that is, in all the relevant models based
on the frame). Given a set  of formulas:
•   B ⇔ For all models M on F: x  A for all A ∈  ⇒ x  B
(For single-premiss entailment we write A  B for {A}  B.)
Now that we have a frame semantics, we focus on objections by D&O that refer
specifically to this set-up.
4 Looking at Worlds
One first objection involves a comparison between (S∧) and (S¬). D&O consider
the following possible criticism of their own position: if the compatibility clause for
negation is problematic, then the standard one for conjunction is as well, because
‘both give the truth conditions for an object-language connective in terms of the
“same” corresponding meta-language connective’ [12, p. 6]. But (S∧), of course, is
not problematic; so (S¬) isn’t either. D&O’s reply:
The difference between (S¬) and (S∧), however, is that the latter is intended to
provide mere truth conditions for object-language sentences and a definition of
conjunction that would “ground the origins of our concept” and its usage in natural
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language. This is why homophonic truth conditions will do for (S∧) but not for
(S¬), and is also why (S¬) is problematic as a grounding definition if negation
cannot be eliminated from the right-hand side of the biconditional. (p. 6)
There are a number of things to say in response to this passage. To begin with, it
gives more evidence that D&O believe the Australian Plan to be after a reduction by
definition of negation. It isn’t.
Next, even the sense in which the homophonic clause for conjunction gives a def-
inition of ‘∧’ is controversial. If one accepts a truth-conditional account of meaning
to begin with, or claims that truth conditions are at least part of what makes for the
meaning of an expression (which is controversial anyway, as testified, e.g., by com-
peting inferentialist accounts), then of course the semantic clauses for the connectives
must tell something about their meaning.
However, as Tarski taught us, the definition one is after when one gives recursive
semantic clauses for a formal language like our L above is, rather, the one of truth
in L. As the official Tarskian wisdom has it, the definition is materially adequate
when we can infer from it the various instances of the T-schema for formulas of
L. Homophonic clauses, on the other hand, presuppose some understanding of the
meaning of the connective used in the metalanguage: see e.g. [46]. One who lacks
the concept of conjunction will not come to understand it by looking at the truth
conditions for conjunctive formulas given in (S∧). The account assumes that we have
some grasp of conjunction (as we, of course, do). The same goes for negation and
(S¬).
For a final remark this ballpark: as mentioned by D&O in another passage quoted
two sections above, one can twist the clause for (S¬) removing the metalinguis-
tic, sentential negation in its right hand side and phrasing the truth conditions using
incompatibility (whose name of course includes ‘in-’, etc. etc.). That’s just another
way this kind of semantics is presented in the literature:
• (S1¬) x  ¬A ⇔ ∀y(y  A ⇒ xIy)
The negation of A is true at point x iff any point making A true is incompatible
with x. This is the form used, for instance, in [16].
(S1¬) is useful in the debate around the Australian Plan: it helps understanding
by packing the controversial bit in the incompatibility relation, I , and allowing to
exploit, again, the obvious duality with the box. Compare (S1¬) with (S) and ask
yourself: is the latter a definition of the box, reducing it to notions that do not involve
necessity and possibility? Of course not: the accessibility relation on its right hand
side stands for (relative) possibility. If one does not have some grasp of what possi-
bility is to begin with, one will not come to understand boxes and diamonds by being
shown their truth conditions in biconditionals that involve y’s being possible rela-
tive to x. Does that disqualify clauses like (S) from having a valuable role in an
explanatory account of the concepts of necessity and possibility? Of course not: all of
contemporary modal logic with Kripke semantics testifies to the usefulness of Kripke
semantics in the analysis of necessity. Though it is not a reduction of the modal to
the non-modal, it is an explication of the truth conditions of modal claims in terms of
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a particular kind of modal claim—relative possibility between worlds. The same sort
of conceptual work is done in the Australian Plan, for (S1¬).
D&O also claim, however, that incompatibility does not explain what it is for a
negation to be true at a point, even if one grants for the sake of the argument that it
be a primitive notion:
It’s true that Sam is not a gram heavier than she actually is, even though she easily
could have been. And since she could easily have been a gram heavier, there are
worlds where she is that are very similar to our own. Indeed, these worlds seem
compatible with ours, if we are going by our intuitive notion of compatibility. And
yet, on the modal account of negation, all the worlds compatible with ours are
ones where Sam is not a gram heavier than she actually is, no matter how similar
they are to ours. Why are all the compatible worlds like this? To emphasize, our
intuitive understanding of (in)compatibility does not tell us that these worlds are
incompatible with ours. If there is any kind of explanation as to why these worlds
should be incompatible with ours, we can only see that it must ultimately appeal
to negation. Worlds where it is true that we are a gram heavier than we actually are
are incompatible with our own because they make true the negation of a sentence
that is here true. [12, p. 6]
Now of course the ‘explanation as to why these worlds should be incompatible
to ours’, in the Australian Plan, runs the other way around with respect to the one
proposed by D&O. Given that Sam weighs n grams at point x, a point y can be
incompatible with x by having Sam weigh n + 1 grams: one cannot simultaneously
have two different weights. Point x, then, makes ‘It is not the case that Sam weighs
n+1 grams’ true by ruling out that Sam is n+1 grams, that is, by being incompatible
with any point making ‘Sam is n+1 grams’ true, as mandated by the Plan’s semantics.
Now why would this go against D&O’s ‘intuitive notion’ or ‘understanding’ of
(in)compatibility? The one way D&O try to provide some content for this alleged
intuition, is by invoking the intuitive similarity between incompatible scenarios.
Compatibility and similarity are, however, independent from each other. Let l be the
state of affairs consisting of this chair’s being light blue all over; d, the state of affairs
consisting of this chair’s being a darker blue all over; r , the state of affairs consisting
of that table’s being red all over. Given some relevant similarity metric, l is more sim-
ilar to d than r is: l and d involve the same object, r , a different one; l and d involve
two shades of color closer on the color scale than l’s is to r’s. Still, l and d are incom-
patible: the chair cannot be simultaneously lighter and darker all over. Instead, l and
r are compatible: a chair’s being light blue does not rule out a table’s being red.
Unsurprisingly, then: in a Kripke-style frame semantics different relations are used
in the semantic clauses for different modal operators. Comparative similarity between
points is likely to show up in the clause for a variably strict conditional, as in the
standard semantics for counterfactuals of Stalnaker [43] and Lewis [25]; relative pos-
sibility, in the clause for the box of positive modality; and, if the Australian Plan is
right, compatibility in the clause for negation.
It is no good, thus, to plainly invoke similarity in an attempt to establish or
undermine claims of incompatibility. One needs to back up such an invocation with
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arguments, on a case by case basis. But D&O give no argument, aside from invoking
intuitions which, we claim, have counterexamples.
Besides contesting the truth conditions for negation proposed in the Plan’s seman-
tics, D&O deem such semantics ‘implausible as an account of how we process and
understand negation’ (p. 3). Here’s why:
It does not seem that when we go about determining whether a negation ¬A is true,
we think about all the A-worlds there are (non-recursively enumerably many!) and
then we see somehow and all at once that each is incompatible with our own. So
it does not seem that we ever understood negation in terms of a primitive notion
of compatibility between worlds that would have “grounded the origins of our
concept”. (pp. 6-7, notation adjusted for consistency with ours.)
But if, as per the Australian Plan’s Idea 2, negation is a modal (which cannot be
ruled out beforehand, on pain of a petitio), that’s exactly not the way we go about
determining whether a negation is true. If Kripke-style frame semantics were com-
mitted to this being the way we evaluated modal claims, no broadly Kripkean or
worlds semantics for any modality could ever be right. This is too much to swallow.
The obvious duality with relative possibility makes this plain. Think about someone
objecting to the standard Kripke semantics for the box along the line D&O pursue:
It does not seem that when we go about determining whether a modality A is true,
we think about all the A-worlds there are (non-recursively enumerably many!) and
then we see somehow and all at once that each is possible relative to our own. So it
does not seem that we ever understood necessity in terms of a primitive notion of
relative possibility between worlds that would have “grounded the origins of our
concept”.
This gets the entire Kripkean story wrong. Whether the points in frames
endowed with accessibility relations represent classical (maximally consistent) possi-
ble worlds, or intuitionistic constructions as in the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic
logic, or situations from situation semantics, or something else, these are the seman-
ticist’s tools. Lay people have for the most part never heard of Kripkean frames or
worlds semantics. Of course, they use ‘necessarily’, ‘if it were the case that . . . , then’,
and ‘not’, generally competently. But this is no objection to a frame-theoretic treat-
ment of such items, a` la Kripke. Kripke himself, and the other logicians working in
the same frame-theoretic tradition, introduced points and accessibilities to provide a
semantic analysis (not perforce, as we have seen, a reductive definition) of various
modal notions. No semantics of this kind is committed to the additional psychologi-
cal claim that, when we go about determining whether a sentence involving a modal
like ‘necessarily’, or ‘if it were the case that . . . , then it would be the case that’, inter-
preted as a (variably or constantly) strict universal quantifier over points in frames,
we need to run through a plurality, or perhaps an infinity, of worlds in our head (all
the relatively possible ones, or the closest accessible ones) before deciding whether
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the sentence is true. To expect that the model theoretic semantics describes some
process of cognition is to ask it to perform tasks beyond its remit.8
5 Logical Pluralism?
One who claims, following Idea 1, that negation is grounded, in the sense clarified
above, in compatibility, and who provides a frame semantics like the one given above
to account for Idea 2 (negation is a modal), is liable to be asked further questions con-
cerning the logical features of negation. By answering such questions, one is liable
to incur in certain commitments, which could be criticized. But one may also refuse
to take a stance on specific questions; which is likely to prompt the further issue
whether the professed neutrality is coherent with the proposed approach to negation.
Here, too, one must be careful to distinguish several issues. A first one is connected
to logical pluralism. FB’s paper, [8], targeted by D&O, entertains a certain pluralism
for negation, connected to the logical pluralism explored by GR in various works. The
connection is the following. Beall and Restall [4, 5] have proposed a logical pluralism
centered on a model-theoretic characterization of the notion of logical consequence,
called Generalized Tarski’s Thesis:
• (GTT) An argument is validx if and only if for every casex in which the premises
hold, so does the conclusion.
The key thought is that ‘case’ is ambiguous here – hence the subscript x – and can be
made precise in different ways, resulting in different notions of validity – hence the
subscript on ‘valid’. Not all ways of making ‘case’ precise are admissible, but more
than one is. Different admissible precisifications of ‘case’ originate different, equally
legitimate notions of logical consequence. It is one thing for cases to be worlds in
the traditional sense of maximally consistent ways things could be or have been; it is
another for cases to be situations, allowing for incompletess, and possibly inconsis-
tency. (FB spoke of ‘worlds’ rather than ‘cases’ but, as explained above, we take this
as a merely terminological matter: in that sense, worlds, or cases, are points of eval-
uation in our frame semantics.) Analogously, that FB paper claimed, the notion of
world in (S¬) can be made precise in different ways, which mandate different kinds
of logical behaviour for the information-inclusion relation  of our semantics. For
instance, if the points are understood as classical, maximally consistent worlds (and
a pair of additional assumptions on compatibility are made), ¬ behaves classically
(in particular, it satisfies Double Negation Elimination and Excluded Middle).
But even if logical pluralism (of this kind) is wrong, this is no objection to the
Australian Plan as such. It might be that, contra Beall and Restall, there is only one
sensible way of characterizing the notion of case showing up in GTT, and that this
8The analogy holds not only with necessity and other modal operators, but also the quantifiers. When
determining whether ∀xFx is true, we need not think about all of the possible assignments of the values
of the variable x in Fx. Regardless, the standard Tarskian semantics for the quantifiers has a role in
explaining the logic of Peano Arithmetic, for example.
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fixes logical consequence up to uniqueness. This is as such no problem for the two
key ideas of the Plan on negation: first, that the meaning of negation is grounded
in such concepts as compatibility and incompatibility; and second, that, since these
are modal notions, negation is a modal as well. Nor would a hypothetical victory
of logical monism be an objection to the way of making the semantics precise that
resorts to frame semantics, taking negation as a restricted quantifier on points of
evaluation.
It is a still different issue what the properties of the restriction should be. It is a
claim made in FB’s Mind paper, that whatever logical pluralism there is for negation
should come from different ways of fine-tuning the notion of point (case, world),
which entail different kinds of behaviour for ; whereas any acceptable negation
must comply with the features of the compatibility relation that grounds negation.
Thus, if the restricting relation C in our semantics must have feature f , and C’s hav-
ing f makes a certain negation-involving inference valid, any negation-like operator
proposed in the literature not validating that inference is no real negation. This brings
no specific commitment yet, on what can make for the relevant f ’s. FB does take
(few) commitments around this topic (we’ll come to this below). But even if these
are wrong, this is no objection to the Plan either. The features of compatibility may
be different from what FB thinks they are, but this by itself brings no trouble to the
Plan’s key Idea 1 and Idea 2.
However, D&O, take as a trouble for a semantics in this ballpark, that it delivers,
all on its own, no clear verdict on the features of (in)incompatibility:
We also do not find the arguments in favor of or against various constraints on
incompatibility compelling enough to allow us to comfortably say that such and
such are the Laws of Negation. If something is to qualify as an adequate account
of negation, it should be fairly clear according to that account what the laws of
negation are. (p. 3)
If ‘clear’ means ‘determined once and for all’ (we take it D&O don’t mean that
compatibility semantics is just obscure), we plainly deny the consequent of the last
quoted claim. What the laws of negation are has been the subject of debate for
millennia. Any putative inferential feature of the connective has been called into
question by someone: from the various Contrapositions and De Morgan laws, to Non-
Contradiction, Excluded Middle, Double Negation Elimination and Introduction, and
the very truth-functionality of the operator [17, see]. The Plan promises a unified
framework in which such debates can be carried out, while overcoming the Quinean
‘change of subject’ threat that any deviation from classicality entails that the parties
are talking past each other. It grounds negation on compatibility and explains a good
deal of disagreement on negation as disagreement on the features of compatibility.
Go back to the duality between positive and negative modalities: in the standard
Kripkean frame semantics for modal logics, we take modal m as a quantifier over
worlds, restricted from the standpoint of a given world by an accessibility relation
endowed with intuitive meaning. We then turn questions about features of m into
questions about features of accessibility. Is m factive? Well, does each point look at
itself? When one m’s that A, does one m that one m’s that A? Well, is accessibility
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transitive? (And so on: this procedure is so well known that it hardly needs rehears-
ing.) It is widely agreed that the relation of relative possibility used in the standard
semantics of positive modals like the box and diamond has intuitive meaning and
helps to provide an enlightening account of such modals. This does not entail that
the intuitive meaning will ensure a unique reply to any question one may ask about
the relation itself. Nor would this fact be taken by anyone as an issue for the stan-
dard, Kripkean possible worlds semantics. Nobody nowadays would raise a claim
like ‘If something is to qualify as an adequate account of m, it should be fairly clear
according to that account what the laws of m are’ as an objection to the standard
framework. To the contrary: before the frame semantics, some would ask: ‘Ok, which
one between S3, S4, etc., is the right system for necessity?’. Now we don’t ask that
anymore. As a popular logic textbook has it:
These notions [normal, positive modals] are highly ambiguous. [. . . ] Which [nor-
mal] system is correct? There is, in fact, no single answer to this question, since
there are many different notions of necessity [. . . ] the first thing that one needs to
do is distinguish among them. [30, pp. 20, 46]
Is this indiscriminate pluralism on m? (‘Any system of conditions on accessibility
gives an equally acceptable m?’). Not quite: we may have different modals charac-
terized by different (sets of) conditions. Still, given condition k, we ask: is k good as
a characterization of that positive modal? (Is the k giving the characteristic validities
for S5 good for metaphysical necessity? Is the one giving the characteristic validities
of GL good for provability? Etc.) We have some grasp of a certain m (metaphysical
necessity, alethic necessity, epistemic commitment, etc.) and we argue on which sys-
tem of conditions on the relevant accessibility best captures it. It is generally agreed
that, by transforming our original question this way, the Kripkean frame seman-
tics with accessibility has brought one of the most celebrated advancements in 20th
Century philosophical logic.
This said, both of us did make, in print, claims on the features of compatibility and
incompatibility, some of which have been challenged by D&O. We have something
to say about these, too.
6 Features of (In)Compatibility
6.1 Symmetry
The only feature of (in)compatibility on which FB takes a resolute positive stance
in the Mind paper is Symmetry. GR is on the same page in [33]. Whatever kinds
of entities a and b are, it seems that if a is incompatible with b, then b has to be
incompatible with a (if a’s obtaining rules out that of b, b’s obtaining rules out that
of a, etc).
If compatibility is symmetric, it is easy to show that Double Negation Introduction
turns out to be valid in our semantics:
• (DNI) A  ¬¬A
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Indeed, a correspondence result from [34, p. 264] shows that DNI holds just in
case compatibility is symmetric.
Is it? D&O repeat a point due to Hartonas and Dunn: ‘The state of my son’s prac-
tising his saxophone prevents my reading, but the state of my reading does not one wit
prevent his practising the saxophone’ [16, p. 32], and argue that prevention provides
an example of a non-symmetric compatibility relation.
One should careful here: of course, prevention is not, in fact, a compatibility rela-
tion at all. If anything, prevention is an incompatibility relation, and if incompatibility
is not symmetric, then its complement relation of compatibility also fails to be sym-
metric, so this is how Dunn and Hartonas’ example could be developed. Given a
semantics involving situations, it is plausible that there is a non-symmetric preven-
tion relation between those situations, such that situation a (involving my son playing
the saxophone) prevents situation b (involving me reading), while b does not in turn
prevent a. On these points we may agree.
However, this does not itself address the question of whether situations a and b are
compatible. On one reading of compatibility, it is clear that they are not: situations
a and b fail to be compatible because a prevents b. On a straightforward reading, no
two situations are compatible when one prevents the other. There is a non-symmetric
positive relation between situations in the vicinity of compatibility: we can say that c
permits d if and only if c does not prevent d, and permitting is not, here, a symmetric
relation. Is permitting a relation of compatibility? It seems to us that it is not. If b
permits a but nonetheless, a does not permit b, then b and a are not compatible: they
do not fit together. In other words, the presence of non-symmetric prevention (and
permission) relations does not mean that compatibility relations need to also be seen
as non-symmetric.
6.2 Reﬂexivity
It is easily shown that, if one assumes ∀x(xCx) (compatibility is reflexive), our
semantics validates the Explosion principle or Ex Contradictione Quodlibet, in the
form:
• (ECQ) A ∧ ¬A  ⊥
This gives us that a contradiction entails everything, via the fact that, by (S⊥),
⊥  B for any B, plus the transitivity of entailment. ECQ is, notoriously, rejected by
paraconsistent logicians, and a first group of claims made by D&O around the issue
of Reflexivity has to do with the interpretation of paraconsistency.
FB claimed in the Mind paper that the intuition that all points (worlds, or whatnot)
must be self-compatible has been countered by paraconsistent logicians. Such a bare
plural was not meant to be interpreted as: ‘by all paraconsistent logicians’, of course
– only some of them. (Bare plurals, as is well known, are ambiguous between generic
and existential readings.) D&O retort that:
Paraconsistent logicians have not said much if anything about compatibility, let
alone whether it is intuitively reflexive. What they have countered is ECQ, the
inference that from a contradiction, anything follows. Most paraconsistentists do
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not endorse a compatibility semantics and those that endorse a semantics which is
formally analogous, such as the Routley star, do not view the relation in question
that governs negation as one of compatibility. (p. 10)
We come back to D&O’s final remark on the lack of (perceived) connection
between the Routley star and compatibility in the coming section. Let’s now quibble
a bit over how one should count paraconsistent logicians. We notice that, for instance,
Dunn [16], Mares [27], Dunn and Zhou [13], and both of us, have worked on relevant
logic, which we all endorse, if not as The One True Logic (some of us are plural-
ists), as one valuable logical theory. Relevant logic is paraconsistent, so we all count
as paraconsistentists to the extent that we count as relevantists. Now the aforemen-
tioned works do say a lot about compatibility, indeed some endorse the Australian
Plan’s compatibility semantics as the favoured semantics for negation in a relevant
logic setting.
As for Reflexivity in particular: in the Mind paper, FB does not take a stance on
the issue whether compatibility is reflexive. But GR does explicitly reject it in [33],
precisely on the basis of the need for inconsistent or self-incompatible points in a
compatibility-based semantics for nonexplosive logics. We are thus happy for one of
us, GR, to contribute a truthmaker for ‘Some paraconsistent logicians have countered
the intuition that all points (worlds, or whatnot) must be self-compatible’.
As a pluralist, GR does not take these self-incompatible points to be possible
worlds (more on this below), but as for inconsistent situations, GR has variously
argued that these are all self-incompatible, and in fact that it is the self-incompatiblity
of these situations that makes them impossible, in the sense of not being included in
any possible world.
Now for the substantive issue: is compatibility reflexive? Besides arguing ad
hominem that paraconsistentists who endorse the Australian Plan will be in a predica-
ment if it is, D&O also give one substantive argument in favour. It goes thus. D&O
(Ibid) claim, correctly, that what logical properties negation has in the Australian
Plan’s semantics depends not only on the features of the compatibility relation C
showing up in (S¬), but also on those of the information-inclusion relation, , which,
in spite of not showing up in (S¬), does show up elsewhere (in particular, in Back-
wards, which, as we know, is needed for  to properly interact with C). They then
introduce the following condition linking information-inclusion to compatibility:
• (LINK) x  y ⇒ xCy
If all the information in x is preserved in y, then x is compatible with y. Assum-
ing Symmetry (which both of us like), we also have ‘a version of (LINK) of the form
x  y ⇒ yCx’ (Ibid, notation adjusted for consistency with ours). Now  is nat-
urally thought of as a partial order, thus reflexive, so ‘it follows immediately that
compatibility is reflexive’ (Ibid).
The argument, however, is question-begging. Acceptance of LINK presupposes
acceptance of Reflexivity, that is, of the idea that all points are self-compatible –
which FB doesn’t endorse, and GR rejects. For suppose y is not self-compatible,
which cannot be ruled out beforehand on pain of a petitio. Then it may well be
the case that for some x, x  y but it is not the case that xCy. Indeed, y may be
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self-incompatible precisely because it encompasses information from x incompatible
with further information y itself supports.
So far, thus, we have not been presented with good arguments for Reflexivity. Now
on to the previously postponed issue, namely the connection between compatibility
and the Routley star.
6.3 Maximal Compatibility and the Star
Assume again that compatibility is symmetric. Add Seriality, ∀x∃y(xCy) (every
point is compatible with some point), and Convergence, that is, the idea that if x is
compatible with anything, then there will be a maximally informative point x is com-
patible with: if ∃y(xCy), then ∃y(xCy & ∀z(xCz ⇒ z  y)). Call this maximally
informative point x∗. Symmetry gives us x  x∗∗. By imposing the converse condi-
tion, x∗∗  x, we validate Double Negation Elimination. Via the antisymmetry of ,
x∗∗ = x. Our clause for negation (S¬) now simplifies into:
• (S*) x  ¬A ⇔ x∗  A
For x∗  A precisely if y  A for all y compatible with x, because xCy just in
case y  x∗: x∗ is a ‘cover all’ for each point y compatible with x.
(S*) is the Routley star semantic clause for de Morgan negation, which gets the
name because (besides Double Negation Introduction and Elimination) it satisfies
all the de Morgan Laws, but differs from Boolean negation by not being explosive.
The star was introduced in [42] as a period two operation mapping each point to its
maximally compatible peer. Notice that negation keeps being a modal in this setup,
for in general x need not be the same as x∗. Negation stops being a modal if we
impose that this indeed be the case: for all x, x = x∗. Then (S*) boils down to
Boolean, classical negation, which is explosive.
D&O present the Routley star semantics for negation as in a certain way alternative
to compatibility semantics:
The philosophical interpretation of the [star] semantics is highly questionable,
however, since it is unclear what sort of interpretation we ought to assign to the
star function that that takes a world to its star-counterpart [. . . ] It would seem
that it is here where (in)compatibility semantics has the advantage since presum-
ably we can attach both clear intuitive and philosophical meaning to the notion of
(in)compatibility.” (p. 2)
But the star semantics is not just another modal account with respect to the com-
patibility semantics. We have in fact just shown (following GR’s [33], which D&O do
not cite) that the star semantics is but the compatibility semantics for negation – once
the appropriate conditions have been added to the latter. So if, as granted by D&O,
‘presumably we can attach clear intuitive and philosophical meaning to the notion
of (in)compatibility’; and we can attach clear and intuitive meaning to the additional
conditions; then we can attach clear and intuitive meaning to the star semantics as
well. The philosophical interpretation of the latter is no more ‘highly questionable’
than that of the compatibility semantics plus that of the appropriate conditions. The
star semantics is just a special case of a compatibility semantics.
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Besides, the appropriate conditions themselves are easily interpreted: we just did
it at the beginning of this subsection. The issue with them is not what their intuitive
meaning is, but whether they hold in a given model. The Australian Plan’s taking
no stance on questions of this kind, as we already argued above, is no problem for
it. However, in [33] GR has considered some reasons for not liking Convergence.
In particular, if x is a consistent and very incomplete point (say, the situation of
some small part of our world), Convergence guarantees that there is a y collecting
up everything compatible with x. This may be wildly inconsistent on all the very
many A’s that x has nothing to say about, for if x  A ∨ ¬A, then y  A ∧ ¬A.
One may, on the other hand, say that the advantages of validating all of de Morgan’s
Laws compensates the admission of certain odd points in our frames. This is another
way in which the semantics of the Australian Plan helps to turn old questions in the
foundations of logic (in particular, concerning constructive versus nonconstructive
accounts of negation) into clearer and more manageable ones, phrased in terms of
(in)compatibility and the extendability of information states.
7 The American Plan, Redux
So much for D&O’s arguments against the Australian Plan. Now let us have a look at
the American Plan, with its independent accounts of truth and falsity. We don’t deny
that American Plan models for different logical systems are interesting and formally
useful. However, using the American Plan comes with its own costs, which should
be noted. We will consider just four:
Coordination between truth and falsity conditions. Why is it that the falsity condi-
tions for ∧, ∨, ∃, ∀ are the obvious de Morgan duals of the truth conditions for these
concepts? The semantics allows for the characterisation of a connective (let’s call it
interjunction) with the truth conditions for ∧ and the falsity conditions of ∨:
• A  B is true iff A is true and B is true.
• A  B is false iff A is false and B is false.
Is interjunction a sensible logical connective? The American Plan makes it just as
available in terms of its basic semantic machinery as any old two-place connective.
If  is meaningful, what does it mean? In particular, what does p  ¬p mean? Is it
expressible in natural language? If interjunction is meaningless, why is it meaning-
less? Isn’t it strange that something can be ‘defined’ in models, which does not make
sense? The same questions can be asked for ‘’, the dual of interjunction, which has
the truth conditions of disjunction and the falsity conditions of conjunction.9
9As remarked by a Referee, the connectives  and  are of interest in theories of bilattices [19]. The
question here, however, is whether they make sense for everyone seeking to follow the American Plan. If
you wish to allow for truth value gaps or truth value gluts to accommodate the paradoxes [3, e.g.], but you
take it that statements in some restricted language take purely classical (non-glut, non-gap) values, then 
and  are inappropriate, for if p is true only or false only, then p  ¬p in neither true nor false, and p  ¬p
is both true and false—with no paradoxes in sight.
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The formal machinery of the American Plan gives us a great deal of freedom to
define concepts. Any American Plan model, in the absence of extra restrictions on
semantic evaluations, allows for such concepts, which may go far beyond what is
called for in a semantics for a given collection of concepts. If we think of the frame
of points as giving a ‘semantic field’ of possible evaluations of sentences, then the
American Plan, as far as D&O have told us, allows for any pair 〈E,A〉 (extension,
anti-extension) of sets of points to be the semantic value of a sentence. This freedom
means that the old boundaries are to be revisited. Is it merely a convention or a coinci-
dence that the truth and falsity conditions of conjunction, disjunction, the quantifiers,
etc, are coordinated in the usual way? If not, what explains this?
There is no such phenomenon in arbitrary Australian Plan models. The semantic
value of a sentence is merely its extension: the set of points at which it is true – closed
under the information-inclusion relation, , if present. The interaction between truth
and falsity is determined by the compatibility relation on the underlying frame. If
the frame allows for a connective such as interjunction, this is down to the behaviour
of the compatibility relation. Given that there are Australian Plan models where
compatibility is Boolean (xCy iff x = y), there are Australian Plan models where
such odd connectives cannot be defined. The coordination between truth and falsity
conditions for connectives such as ∧, ∨ and the quantifiers is given a uniform expla-
nation on Australian Plan models, in terms of the behaviour of compatibility. No such
explanation is given in the American Plan as it stands.
Complexity of truth and falsity conditions. A related cost of using the American
Plan as one’s model for giving a truth-conditional semantics is the added complexity
of giving independent truth and falsity conditions for concepts.
Consider the insight in the Lewis–Stalnaker analysis of counterfactuals as variably
strict modals: A > B is true at a point x when B is true at the A-points nearest to x.
Question: when is A > B false at a point? On an American Plan semantics, nearly
any answer to this question is formally compatible with its truth conditions.10 This
does not make any answer equally good. How is such a question to be addressed?
Given the complexity of giving American Plan models for relevant logics [41], giving
American Plan models for counterfactuals will also be complex.
In the Australian Plan, giving the truth conditions for A > B at points in a frame
determines the interaction between the counterfactual conditional and negation, and
hence the falsity conditions for A > B. No such answer is given in an American
10Of course, not every account of the falsity conditions for a connective will be compatible with other
constraints on the language as a whole. For example, logics like first degree entailment FDE, Priest’s
logic of paradox, LP , and Kleene’s three valued logic K3, all have the property that if the atomic formulas
have classical truth values, then so do any complex expressions constructed out of those values. (Notice,
this is not satisfied in logics with connectives such as  and .) Conditions like this place constraints on the
falsity conditions for a connective. D&O do not tell us whether conditions like this are to be satisfied or
not, and nothing in the American Plan by itself tells us whether constraints like these ought to be respected.
Negation on the Australian Plan
Plan model. If truth and falsity are as independent as is allowed in American Plan
semantics, then truth conditions do not (by themselves) give falsity conditions.11
Not fully utilising the strengths of point semantics. At an abstract level, a strength
of a frame semantics, such as Kripke models for modal logics or Routley–Meyer
models for relevant logics, is the set-theoretic representation of logical concepts. Sen-
tences are recursively assigned sets of points. Entailment is subsethood. Conjunction
is intersection. Modalities, positive and negative, are closure operators mediated by
accessibility relations (or other set-theoretical operations). The picture is formally
powerful and philosophically salient. It differs from algebraic semantics were we
evaluate sentences as taking various values in a many-valued algebra (three, four,
or many more). These kinds of models are also formally useful and philosophically
salient.
But an American Plan worlds semantics is a hybrid of both of these. As far as
we can see, there is no principle given as to why we have stopped at four distinct
semantic values at each world. If formulas can be true, false, both and neither at
worlds,12 why not also allow for modal values of necessity and possibility? Why do
we analyse them in terms of truth and falsity at other worlds and not think of them
as different semantic statuses at this world? The American Plan is a halfway house
between a worlds semantics and a many-valued logic, which seems to miss out on
some benefits of either approach on its own.
Drawing the wrong distinctions among concepts. The American Plan, as D&O
would have it, counts intuitionist negation and the ortho-negation of quantum logics
as failing to be genuine negations. To be a negation, on their view, is to satisfy the
constraints of first degree entailment or stronger logics. As proponents of the Aus-
tralian Plan, we can see the distinction that is being drawn here — all of these logics
are equally well modelled using the Routley Star, which as we have seen, is a kind of
Australian Plan semantics — but it would be a genuine cost to divide the line between
genuine negations and other kinds of negative operators here, and to leave out ortho-
negation and intuitionist negation, venerable claimants to the title of an analysis of
negation. Friends of the Australian Plan can agree that intuitionistic negation is a
genuine constructive analysis of negation, and not some foreign modal notion. It is
a genuine cost to say that the core notion of negation is such that by definition our
constructivist and intuitionist colleagues are making systematic conceptual errors. To
take the core of the concept of negation to be given by the American Plan, one has to
pay this cost, by giving some account of how it is that these notions miss the mark.
This is particularly pressing given the understanding that D&O have of nega-
tion as a contradictory-forming operator (see their Definition 1). In ortholattices,
11A Referee reminds us that this flexibility allows the proponent of the American Plan to give a simple
semantics for connexive logics (see, for example Priest [30, Section 9.7]). We have the flexibility—for
example—to allow A > B to be false when and only when A > ¬B is true. In effect, we identify
¬(A > B) with A > ¬B. If ⊥ > A is true for every A, then ⊥ > A and ¬(⊥ > A) are both true.
12Each sentence has one of these four different statuses whether we think of these as four distinct values
in an explicitly four-valued semantics, or a two-valued relational semantics in which formulas may be
related to the two values 0 and 1 [30]. In this case, there are still four different semantic statuses, even if
we prefer to think of 0 and 1 as the only two truth values.
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ortho-negation is exactly a contradictory forming operator in D&O’s sense. In intu-
itionistic logics, whether negation forms contradictories depends on what is meant by
falsity. We can see, however, that in intiuitionistic logic, negation is a contradictory
forming operator in a stronger sense than allowed by D&O: for any sentence A, we
have A,¬A  (A and its negation are inconsistent), and ¬A is the weakest sentence
with that property.
8 Conclusions
We have defended the Australian Plan, with its Idea 1 and Idea 2, as a coherent
and natural account. It is the picture of negation that you get when you use the tools
of a point semantics, analysing semantic values of sentences as sets of points, and
entailment between sentences in terms of the subset relation. Once we move beyond
thinking of points as consistent and complete worlds, the Australian Plan gives an
intuitive view of the semantic behaviour of negation. Not only is this a defensible
formal model; the core notion, the binary relation of compatibility between points,
is natural when it comes to understanding how our concept of negation is grounded.
This grounding can be specified both metaphysically (as a robust notion of compat-
ibility between situations) and pragmatically (in terms of norms governing the clash
between assertion and denial). So the Australian Plan is not only a productive tool
when it comes to the formal semantics of negation: it is also eminently defensible on
philosophical grounds.13
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